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At least 25 developing countries are embarking on irrigation governance reforms to address the persistent problem of poor irrigation performance. Some scholars suggest that the patterns of construction, deterioration, rehabilitation, and modernization commonly found among irrigation agencies in these countries are rational because of the time inconsistency problem of information. I argue instead, using panel data from the Philippines, that the problem of poor performance is linked to inherent incentive problems faced by public bureaucracies, how these incentives became entrenched in the path dependence of irrigation development, and how these were reinforced by incentives embedded in irrigation aid, particularly by the moral hazard problem and the fundability of irrigation aid.

At least 25 developing countries are embarking on irrigation governance reforms to address the persistent problem of poor irrigation performance. Some scholars suggest that the patterns of construction, deterioration, rehabilitation, & modernization commonly found among irrigation agencies in these countries are rational because of the time inconsistency problem of information. I argue instead, using panel data from the Philippines, that the problem of poor performance is linked to inherent incentive problems faced by public bureaucracies, how these incentives became entrenched in the path dependence of irrigation development, & how these were reinforced by incentives embedded in irrigation aid, particularly by the moral hazard problem & the fungibility of irrigation aid. Tables, Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractTaking water institutions as an illustrative context, this paper attempts a quantitative analysis of the structural and functional linkages within institutional structure and indicates their performance implications and strategic importance for promoting institutional reforms. Against an overview of existing empirical works on institutions in general and water institutions in particular, the paper develops an analytical framework for specifying alternative models of institution–performance interaction within the water sector under different assumptions concerning institutional linkages and their structural properties. These models are, then, empirically estimated using the perception-based information provided by an international panel of 127 water experts from 43 countries and regions around the world. Based on the model results, the paper offers quantitative evidences for institutional linkages and their performance implications, and concludes by indicating their policy roles, especially in developing some reform design and implementation principles useful to overcome the technical and political economy constraints for institutional reforms.

This Doctoral Thesis unfolds into a collection of three distinct papers that share an interest in institutional theory and technology transfer. Taking into account that organizations are increasingly exposed to a multiplicity of demands and pressures, we aim to analyze what renders this situation of institutional complexity more or less difficult to manage for organizations, and what makes organizations more or less successful in responding to it. The three studies offer a novel contribution both theoretically and empirically. In particular, the first paper "The dimensions of organizational fields for understanding institutional complexity: A theoretical framework" is a theoretical contribution that tries to better understand the relationship between institutional complexity and fields by providing a framework. The second article "Beyond institutional complexity: The case of different organizational successes in confronting multiple institutional logics" is an empirical study which aims to explore the strategies that allow organizations facing multiple logics to respond more successfully to them. The third work " How external support may mitigate the barriers to university-industry collaboration" is oriented towards practitioners and presents a case study about technology transfer in Italy.

"Using aggregate analysis, this paper examines the core contentions of the 'varieties of capitalism' perspective on comparative capitalism. We construct a coordination index to assess whether the institutional features of liberal and coordinated market economies conform to the predictions of the theory. We test the contention that institutional complementarities occur across sub-spheres of the macroeconomy by examining the correspondence of institutions across sub-spheres and estimating the impact of complementarities in labor relations and corporate governance on rates of growth. To assess the stability of the institutional features central to the theory, we assess the dynamics of institutional change in recent years. The evidence suggests that there are powerful interaction effects among institutions across sub-spheres of the political economy that must be considered if the economic impact of institutional change in any one sphere is to be accurately assessed." (author's abstract)

The theme of this essay is how to engage with unconscious dynamics in our analysis of institutions. The essay clarifies the ways in which the unconscious influences institutional structures and organizational practices, and this is the main theoretical contribution to organization studies. A conceptual framework is presented that can help scholars of organizations and institutions to deepen analysis and understanding of how people's organizational lives can be shaped by dynamics that are beyond reason, as well as how such dynamics are embedded in social structures. The terms unconscious and institution are aligned to illustrate a new concept, 'institutional illogics'. This refers to the structuring and unsettling effects of unconscious dynamics, particularly social defences and shared fantasies, on organizations and institutions. Examples from published, empirical papers are used to illustrate the value of the framework. The concept of illogics is intended to encourage balance alongside the influence of logics on institutional analysis.

Leaders shift political institutions to ameliorate threats to their tenure. The masses might rebel to replace the leader and change institutions. Disloyalty by political insiders might result in a coup. Leaders liberalize when the masses present a greater threat and 'autocratize' to dissipate threats from elites. A two-step procedure tests these arguments: (1) The risks of revolution and coup are estimated as a function of leader health, experience, economic conditions and extant institutions. (2) These risks are used to predict institutional change in a heteroskedastic regression model. The magnitude and direction of institutional change depends upon whether the masses or elites pose the greater threat. When both risks are high, leaders must gamble as to which risk they believe is greatest. In such circumstances, institutions are highly volatile even as the aggregate direction of change becomes unclear.